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INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT OF LAWS-TITLE TO CHATIELS"AcT OF STATE" DocTRINE-Although in conflict of laws rules the
title to chattels derived from transactions occurring in a foreign
state is generally determined with reference to the law of the situs
of the chattels at the time of the transaction,1 an exception is recognized when the laws affecting the foreign transaction are contrary
1 CoNFLicr OF

LAws

RF.s'l'ATEMENT

§260 (1934).
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to the forum state's public policy.2 This exception, however, is
often not recognized where the transaction was an act of expropriation without compensation by the foreign state. American courts
refuse to invalidate the transfer by invoking public policy or international law, relying on what is known as the "act of state" doctrine. 3 This doctrine states that the municipal courts of the forum
state will not question the validity of the actions of a foreign
sovereign within its own territory, even when such actions affect
aliens to that foreign sovereign.4 The doctrine has been applied
though the foreign government is not recognized by our government,5 though the acts of the foreign government are illegal by the
laws of that country,6 and even though it is the property of an
American citizen which has been confiscated.7
An expropriation without compensation by the United States
is, of course, a violation of the United States Constitution, 8 even
when the property belongs to an alien. Such confiscation by other
countries, however, may not violate their internal law, and is generally conceded not to be a violation of international law if the
property is owned by nationals of that country.9 The question of
whether confiscation by other countries of the property of aliens
to those countries is a violation of international law, however, has
been argued for decades. Today an increasing number of authorities recognize that such acts do violate international law.1 ° For the
2 CONFLicr OF LAws R!:srATEMENT §612 (1934); Ciampittiello v. Campitello, 134 Conn.
51, 54 A. (2d) 669 (1947).
3 Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
4 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
Ii Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
6 Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, (2d Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 438.
7 Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
8 U. S. CONST., Amend. V.
9 This arises from the nature of international law, in which only "states" are proper
parties to enforce international rights. Therefore, the national of a confiscating state
has no other state which can present his claim.
10 This comment will not consider the question of whether or not such a rule is a
one of international law. While the existence of such a rule is denied by FRIEDMAN,
EXPROPRIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw (1953), the existence of such a rule is maintained
by Seidl-Hohenveldern, "Extra-territorial Effects of Confiscations and Expropriations," 13
Mo». L. REv. 69 at 69 (1950); Cheng, "Expropriation in International Law," 21 SoucrroR
98 at 99 (1954); Fawcett, "Some Foreign Effects of Nationalization of Property," 27 BRIT.
Y. B. INT. L. 355 at 368 (1950); Herz, "Expropriation of Foreign Property," 35 AM. J.
INT. L. 243 at 254 (1941); Rubin, "Nationalization and Compensation-A Comparative
Approach," 17 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 458 at 460 (1950); Re, "The Nationalization of ForeignOwned Property," 36 MINN. L. REv. 323 at 328-329 (1952); Wortley, "Expropriation in
International Law," 33 TRANS. GRoT. Soc. 25 at 31 (1947); Mann, "International Delinquencies Before National Courts," 70 L. Q. REV. 181 at 188 (1954); ADRIAANSE, CONFIS·
CATION IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (1956). It is interesting to follow the argument
in its inception through the opposing papers of Fachiri and Williams in 6 BRIT. Y.B. INT.
L. 159 (1925), 9 BRIT. Y.B. !NT. L. I (1928), and 10 BRIT. Y.B. !NT. L. 32 (1929).
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purposes of this comment, it will be assumed that confiscation of
the property of aliens without compensation is a violation of international law. It is the purpose of this comment to investigate
the source of the "act of state" doctrine in the relevant court decisions and to discuss the doctrine in light of pertinent policy considerations. The inquiry here is whether municipal courts, particularly American courts, should apply the international law
standard to the confiscatory actions of a state against an alien in
all types of cases, or whether the wronged individual should be left
solely to his international law remedies, which in these cases are
often unavailable or grossly inadequate. International law has been
repeatedly applied in other civil cases by our courts. The refusal to
so apply the international law rule against confiscations is the
essence of the "act of state" doctrine as it will be discussed in the
comment.11
An example of the application of the "act of state" doctrine
would be the situation where jewelry in Spain owned by a French
national was confiscated by the Spanish Government, later sold to
an Italian national and then brought into the United States where
the French owner sues to recover possession of the jewelry as his
property. If the "act of state" doctrine is applied the Italian national would retain the jewelry, on the ground the Spanish confiscation passed title to the Spanish Government, the court not
judging the validity of the confiscation by the standards of international law.
The "act of state" doctrine must not be confused with the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It has long been held that a sovereign
cannot be sued in the courts of another country without his consent.12 As a corollary it has been held that the property of a sovereign is not subject to judicial process in another state,13 and that
a sovereign or his agents cannot be sued in the courts of another
state for acts done within the state of the sovereign.14 None of
these situations arises in the application of the true "act of state"
doctrine, for the property in question has been transferred by the
11 The "act of state" doctrine, as discussed in this comment, is used in a very narrow
and restricted sense. There is a much broader concept often called the "act of state"
doctrine. This broader concept will be alluded to only incidentally. It can be found dis•
cussed in 2 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL I.Aw 23-30 (1906); MooRE, Ac:r OF STATE
IN ENGLISH I.Aw (1906); Wade, "Act of State in English Law: Its Relations with Interna•
tional Law," 15 BRIT. Y.B. !NT. L. 98 (1934).
12 2 HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL !.AW §§169-176 (1941).
113Ibid.
14 Id., §§169, 175.
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sovereign to a third party, and the original owner is suing the third
party in an action to try title. Thus the French national in the
hypothetical case would not be able to sue for recovery of his
property if it were still owned by the Spanish Government,
whether or not the "act of state" doctrine were accepted. The
question here, however, is whether the acts of the sovereign validly
affect the rights of the parties when the property is transferred
to a third party and taken to another state.
In order to clarify the use of terms, a "confiscation" when used
in this comment will mean an expropriation by a foreign state
without compensation. This writer will not go into the question
of what is considered fair compensation in international law. Nor
will the present comment consider confiscations made in time of
war or the question of extraterritorial expropriations.

I. American Precedent
The American doctrine on the subject arose from an oftquoted statement by Chief Justice Fuller in Underhill v. Hernandez:15 "The courts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another done within its own territory." In reality, the case did not involve the "act of state" doctrine as herein defined. No property was involved in the suit.
Underhill was suing in tort for the actions of Hernandez, who at
the time of the alleged tort was in command of the revolutionary
army in Venezuela. A more correct statement of the basis of decision in the case is also given by Chief Justice Fuller: "If actual war
has been waged, acts of legitimate warfare cannot be made the
basis of individual liability.''16
The Underhill case was relied upon by Justice Clarke, however, in two cases which formulated the "act of state" doctrine.
The first of these, Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,11 involved a suit
by Mexican citizens to recover hides which had been seized by
Villa during the Mexican revolution. Judge Clarke stated:
"It is also the result of interpretation by this court of the principles of international law that when a government . . . is
recognized by the political department of our government as
the de jure government of the country in which it is estab15168 U.S. 250 at 252 (1897).
16 Id. at 253.
11246 U.S. 297 (1918).
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lished, such recognition is retroactive in effect and validates
all the actions and conduct of the government so recognized
from the commencement of its existence...." 18
Whether he attributed the doctrine to the fact of recognition or
to a rule of international law is not clear. The possibility that the
Oetjen case could be limited to situations involving nationals of
the confiscating state was repudiated by a companion case. In
Ricaud v. American Metal Co.,19 the plaintiff was an American
citizen suing for lead bullion, seized in Mexico during the revolution, which had been sold to a third party and which was in the
United States at the time of suit. Justice Clarke stated, "The fact
that the title to the property in controversy may have been in an
American citizen ... does not affect the rule of law... .''20
These decisions laid down the "act of state" doctrine, which
has since been followed in American courts without any real examination of the policies involved. They could as well have been
founded on a theory previously recognized by the Supreme Court
that, in time of civil war, property in enemy territory is subject
to seizure or destruction by a belligerent.21
, The doctrine was again enunciated by the Second Circuit in
Hewitt v. Speyer.22 In this case the plaintiff had a mortgage on the
customs receipts of Ecuador. The defendant obtained treasury
certificates "subject to" plaintiff's mortgage. Ecuador paid the
defendant out of the customs receipts first, and plaintiff sued to
obtain the money paid by the government. Both parties were
American citizens. The court held that there was no cause of action, citing the Underhill decision. The plaintiff in this case never
had title to the money. Moreover, the act complained of was one
taken by a government to preserve its own credit. It is generally
conceded that measures such as currency exchange control and
monetary devaluation are not a violation of international law,23
and the situation in this case seems comparable.24
18 Id. at 302 and 303.
19 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
20 Id. at 310.

21.See Young v. United States, 97 U.S. 39 (1877), refusing damages for a seizure of
cotton by Federal forces, and Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594 (1878), refusing damages for a
destruction of cotton under the orders of Confederate forces.
22 (2d Cir. 1918) 250 F. 367.
23Foighel, "Nationalization,'' 26 NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INT. REr. 89 at 100; Lauterpacht, "Re Helbert Wagg: A Further Comment,'' 5 INT. & COMP. L. Q. 301 at 303 (1956).
24 A similar situation was involved in Frazier v. Foreign Bondholders Protective
Council, 283 App. Div. 44, 125 N.Y.S. (2d) 900 (1953).
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The next case involving the doctrine arose out of the Spanish
Civil War. 25 The Loyalist government confiscated silver in Spain
from a Spanish bank by secret decree. The silver was then sold to
the United States. After the Franco regime came into power, the
bank sued the United States to recover the silver. The Franco
government asked the court to review the legality of the act of
confiscation under Spanish law, it being claimed that the confiscation was illegal. Nevertheless, recovery was denied under the
"act of state" principle. The decision could have been based upon
the fact that the property confiscated was the property of a national of the confiscating state.
In United States v. Belmont26 and United States v. Pink,21 the
Supreme Court held that confiscatory decrees issued by the Russian
Government were valid to pass title to property which was in the
United States at the time of the decrees. The decision was rested
on the effect of recognition by the executive, the federal policy
taking precedence over the public policy of New York, and not
specifically on the "act of state" doctrine, which is generally conceded not to apply to extraterritorial confiscations.28 The decisions have been severely criticized,29 and it seems certain that
they will not be extended.
In Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme30 and
Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 31 title to property acquired by Nazi confiscation of property of the Jews was
upheld by the Second Circuit through application of the "act of
state" doctrine. Judge Learned Hand intimated, however, that
the rule would not be applied if there were a declaration by the
Executive that the principle should not be applied.32 These decisions were severely criticized.33 Subsequently, the acting legal
25

Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, (2d Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 438.

26 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
27 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
28 Zwack v. Kraus Bros. &:

Co., (2d Cir. 1956) 237 F. (2d) 255; Seidl-Hohenveldern,
"Confiscation and Expropriation Problems in International Law," 83 JOURNAL nu DRoIT
INTERNATIONAL 381 at 389, 390 (1956).
29 Jessup, "The Litvinov Assignment and the Pink Case," 36 AM. J. INT. L. 282
(1942); Borchard, "Extraterritorial Confiscations," 36 AM. J. INT. L. 275 (1942). But see
note, 48 CoL. L. REv. 890 (1948).
30 (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 246, cert. den. 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
31 (2d Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 71.
32 "[T]he only relevant consideration is how far our Executive has indicated any
positive intent to relax the doctrine that our courts shall not entertain actions of the
kind at bar; some positive evidence of such an intent being necessary." Bernstein v. Van
Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 246 at 251.
33 See comments, 57 YALE L.J. 108 (1947); 47 COL. L. REv. 1061 (1947).
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adviser of the State Department stated that the policy of the
Executive was opposed to the recognition of Nazi "acts of state."34
Following this expression of policy, the court by per curiam
opinion struck out "all restraints based on the inability of the
court to pass on acts of officials in Germany during the period in
question."35 Unfortunately, the case was not appealed.
On review of these decisions, it is seen that the "act of state"
do_ctrine grew like Topsy, through an inadequate examination of
the real issues involved. On their facts, the results reached could
have been reached on other and more secure grounds. In none
of them was a confiscation in time of peace of the property of a
non-national of the confiscating state involved. Yet the purport
of the decisions, at least up to the time of the Bernstein decisions,
has led scholars to conclude that the principle is "firmly entrenched"36 in American law. The Bernstein decisions propounded
a new basis for the "act of state" doctrine, a basis which may eventually lead to its discard.
It is not clear what the doctrine was initially based upon. Perhaps it was based upon a misinterpretation of the sovereign immunity doctrine already discussed. Many commentators as well
as the judges in the Bernstein case feel that it was based upon the
constitutional doctrine of "political" questions,37 the judiciary
• accepting the executive act of recognition of the foreign government as an approval and validation of that government's previous
acts beyond which the courts could not inquire without invading
the delicate field of foreign policy.38 In this view of the doctrine,
recognition becomes vitally important.39 Yet state courts have
34 Letter of Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, April 13,
1949, 20 DEPT. OF STATE But. 592 (1949).
35 Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, (2d Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 375 at
376.
36 RE, FOREIGN CONFISCATIONS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 169 (1951). See also Stevenson, "Effect of Recognition on the Application of Private International Law Norms," 51
CoL. L. REv. 710 at 713 (1951).
37 This undoubtedly arises from language such as that previously quoted from the
Underhill and Oetjen opinions.
38 "[T]he conduct of foreign relations was committed by the Constitution to the
political departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power was not subject to judicial inquiry or decision..••"
United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 at 328 (1937).
39 It is interesting to note that the writers disagree on the effect to be given the
act of recognition. Seidl-Hohenveldern, "Extraterritorial Effects of Confiscations and
Expropriations," 49 MICH. L. REv. 851 (1951), feels that the "act of state" doctrine should
be applied only to recognized governments, whereas Borchard, "The Unrecognized
Government in American Courts," 26 AM. J. INT. L. 261 (1932), feels that recognition
should not be required.
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applied the "act of state" doctrine to non-recognized governments,40 and a dictum in the Underhill case states that it does not
matter whether the government is recognized or not.41 Furthermore, this rationale does not fit all the cases. Even if recognition
were an approval of acts done by the recognized state before recognition were granted, it certainly cannot be contended that it is
also a blanket approval of everything the recognized state does after
the date of recognition. To say it were would be to attribute
powers of prophecy to the executive. Yet the doctrine is applied
without question to "acts of state" done both before and after
recognition. 42 Similarly, if the real basis of the doctrine is executive approval of the confiscatory acts, expressed in the fact of recognition, the courts are being hypocritical in their frequent statements that the frustrated litigant may have a remedy through
proper diplomatic channels; 43 the courts would then be in the
position of urging the litigant to try a remedy they should know
the executive would not give, since the executive certainly would
not assert a diplomatic claim against acts of which it approved.
The doctrine may not be based on the "political question"
theory, but rather on an erroneous conception of international
law rules. 44 The Court in the Oetjen and Ricaud cases evidently
felt that the international law doctrine of sovereign immunity for
acts of a state's agents done within its territory4 5 also applied in this
type of case to validate title. In the Oetjen case the Court states,
"It is also the result of interpretation by this court of the principles
of international law."46 Looked at in this light, the "rule of de40 Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933). This also
involved citizens of the confiscating state, however.
41 "Nor can the principle be confined to lawful or recognized governments, or to
cases where redress can manifestly be had through public channels." Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 at 252 (1897).
42 Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, (2d Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 438, and
Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 246, cert.
den. 332 U.S. 772 (1947), both involved acts of governments which were recognized before
the confiscations were effected.
43 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 at 252 (1897); Oetjen v. Central Leather
Co., 246 U.S. 297 at 304 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 at 310
(1918); Hewitt v. Speyer, (2d Cir. 1918) 250 F. 367 at 371-372.
44 Of four early law review commentaries on the Oetjen and Ricaud cases, three
notes treat the question as one of international, rather than constitutional, law. 18 CoL.
L. R.Ev. 611 (1918); 31 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1167 (1918); 86 CENT. L. J. 259 (1918). The fourth
propounds the "political" question theory and applies the "act of state" label. Comment,
27 YALE L. J. 812 (1918).
45 See note 14 supra.
40 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 at 302 (1918).
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cision" the Court speaks of in the Ricaud case47 would be a rule of
international law, not a rule propounded by the executive. Therefore, it was not necessary for the state court to determine the
validity of the confiscation,48 since the Court felt that international
law prevented municipal courts from looking into such questions.
Even if the Supreme Court was not applying international law
in these cases, it is evident that the Court felt it was applying a
rule of law-not merely acceding to the wishes of the executive.
Why, then, was recognition so important? The answer must be
that it showed conclusively that the confiscation was not a lawless
one perpetrated by a "group of bandits," but by a group which
succeeded to the government.49 In short, it showed that the confiscation was not a mere theft, but an "act of state." Once the government was recognized by the executive, the judiciary could not
question the fact that it was a government. Attaching this significance to the fact of recognition makes immaterial the question
whether the foreign state was recognized before or after the confiscation.
The Bernstein decisions were the result of an extension of the
view attaching prime importance to the act of recognition as an
approval of the foreign state's acts. The result of the latter Bernstein decision is not criticized, but the way in which that result was
reached may be, on the ground that with such an approach determination of title to property is made, in actuality, by the executive and not the judicial branch of the government.50 While admitting that the question is basically one of public policy, it seems
strange to require the courts to look to the executive for the determination of that policy in· each instance. The determination
of whether or not a foreign government is recognized by our government is admittedly a question to be decided solely by the
executive, but the legal effects arising from the status determined
by the executive would seem better decided by the courts than by
47Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 at 309-310 (1918).
48 See Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 at 304 (1918).
49 "It is idle to argue that the proceedings of those who thus triumphed should be
treated as the acts of banditti or mere mobs." Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250 at
253 (1897).
50 "While justice 'better late than never' is better than none at all, it is regrettable
that the executive must lead the courts by the hand to a decision upholding basic notions of
public policy and due process of law." Olmstead, "International Law/' 30 N.Y. UNIV. L.
REv. 1 at 12-13 (1955).
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the executive.51 Instead of allowing the executive to determine not
only the status of the foreign government, but whether or not its
acts are in accord with public policy, it would seem wiser to discard the "act of state" doctrine entirely, and let the executive
handle only those questions of foreign relations within its own
sphere of competence. Thus, if the executive felt it was necessary
to our foreign policy, the executive could conclude a treaty and
validate the title thus acquired,52 or could indemnify the foreign
country for the injuries it suffered through the denial of validity
of its title.
The Bernstein decision suggests one manner by which the
effects of the "act of state" doctrine may be limited. Another
method of reaching the same end is suggested by the new United
States policy limiting sovereign immunity from suit in cases where
the foreign state is engaged in primarily commercial enterprises.113
Re says:
"Thought should be given to the possibility of treating the
foreign country as a trader when a question concerning such
nationalized property is presented in American courts. . . .
Once it is proposed that a foreign nation should no longer
enjoy sovereign immunity from suit with respect to its 'private'
acts, it follows naturally that the act itself should no longer
enjoy immunity from judicial scrutiny.''54
This argument is not strong, however, for the act of nationalization is distinct from acts taken later when engaged in trading
with the nationalized property. The act of nationalization would
still be an exercise of a governmental function. However, the new
policy does indicate a tendency to restrict the broad immunities
previously granted foreign sovereigns.
51 "In cases involving sovereign immunity it used to be assumed that the only
question which the political branch of the government was called upon to decide was
the status of the government or its agents. The trend of United States decisions, culminating in the Hoffman case, would now make it appear that the State Department must also
determine the basic legal principle governing the immunity." Jessup, "Has the Supreme
C.ourt Abdicated One of its Functions?" 40 AM. J. INT. L. 168 at 169 (1946).
52 Cf. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
53 Letter of Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, 26 DEPT. OF
STATE BuL. 984 (1952). See Bishop, "New United States Policy Limiting Sovereign Immunity," 47 AM. J. INT. L. 93 (1953).
54 Re, "Nationalization and the Investment of Capital Abroad," 42 GEO. L. J. 44 at
62-64 (1953).
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II. Foreign Precedent
The English courts initially seemed inclined toward the idea
that title to property acquired through a violation of international
law would not be upheld in their municipal courts, but then reverted to a position very close to that of American courts. The
modern position is not yet clear.
In Wolff v. Oxholm55 the defendant Oxholm attempted to
defend an action for the recovery of a debt on the grounds that he
had paid the debt56 to the Danish Government in compliance with
a confiscatory law of Denmark. The ordinance was passed as a
wartime measure, but absolved the debt for all purposes in Denmark. After a review of international law authorities, Chief
Justice Ellenborough held that payment under the Danish act
was no defense: "The parties . . . are not bound by the quashing
of their suit, in consequence of a subsequent ordinance, not conformable to the usage of nations, and which, therefore, they could
not expect, nor are they or we bound to regard." 57

Wolff v. Oxholm was followed in Chancery in 1917 in In re
Fried Krupp Actien-Gesellschaft.58 The case involved a German
law which abrogated the obligation to pay interest to enemies
during the World War I. The law was held inapplicable to a contract interpreted according to German law partly on the ground
that the law was one "which is not conformable to the usage of
nations." 59
Neither of the above cases is strong precedent for the proposition that title derived from foreign acts of confiscation, in time of
peace, will not be given effect against non-nationals of the confiscating state. In both cases the measures were laws passed by the
enemy in time of war, the laws were penal, and neither case involved title to property. The first involved a chose in action and
the second a contract.
This trend was reversed in 1921 by the decision of King's Bench
in Aksionairnoye Obschestvo A. M. Luther v. James Sagor & Co.60
55 6

M. & S. 92, 105 Eng. Rep. 1177 (1817).
rate of payment was actually about one-eighth the rate of exchange existing
at the time of payment.
57 6 M. & S. 92, 105 Eng. Rep. 1177 at 1182 (1817).
58 [1917] 2 Ch. 188.
,59 Id. at 194.
60 [1921] 1 K.B. 456, revd. [1921] 3 K.B. 532.
56 The
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This was a suit by a Russian company61 to recover lumber confiscated by the Russian Communist Government. The first decision by Justice Roche refused to give effect to the Soviet decrees,
solely on the ground that the British Government had not recognized the Soviet Government. He stated, however, that if the
Soviet Government were recognized, the court would have to
recognize the validity of its acts. He did not discuss the doctrine
of Wolff v. Oxholm, finding such discussion unnecessary. The
decision in the court of appeal was given after the British Government had recognized the Soviet Government as the de facto government of Russia. Although the Lord Justices stated that the
previous opinion of Justice Roche was correct in the absence of
recognition, the court unanimously held that title acquired by
the Soviet confiscatory decrees was valid in British courts after
recognition. They stated that it made no difference whether the
recognition was de facto or de jure, or whether the acts were contrary to moral principles. The possibility that the confiscation
was a violation of international law was not discussed, and none
of the Lord Justices considered the principle of Wolff v. Oxholm,
though it was cited by counsel in their argument. 62 The Lord
Justices relied heavily upon American precedent, citing particularly Oetjen v. Central Leather Co. 63 and Underhill v. Hernandez.64 The case is strong precedent in British law, though not
binding on the House of Lords. Some factors in the case, however,
are worthy of note. First, the case involved nationals of the confiscating state, and therefore the confiscation was not contrary to
international law. Second, the court did not discuss the international law aspects of the case. This is probably because the
applicable doctrine of international law has been recognized only
in recent years, and was in dispute at the time the case was decided.
Third, none of the Lord Justices mentioned Ricaud v. American
Metal Co., which held that the fact that property was confiscated
from a citizen of the forum would not change the rule. Evidently
they did not want to commit themselves on this point.
Luther v. Sagor was followed in Princess Paley Olga v. Weisz. 65
The facts were similar. Plaintiff, a Russian national, was suing
61 It was contended that the company was an Esthonian company, but this was
rejected by the court. [1921] 1 K.B. 456 at 478; [1921] 3 K.B. 532 at 546, 552, 553.
62 [1921] 3 K.B. 532 at 538.
68 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
64168 U.S. 250 at 252 (1897).
615 [1929] 1 K.B. 718.
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for property, confiscated in Russia by the Soviet Government,
which had been sold to a third party and was then in England.
Lord Justice Scrutton cited the Ricaud case and noted that the
confiscation was upheld "with respect to the property of a citizen
of the United States." 66 It seems evident from the tenor of his
opinion that he would have extended the rule to a case involving
a British citizen. Lord Justice Sankey did not cite the Ricaud
case and gives no intimation whether or not he would extend the
principle to a case involving a British national. Lord Justice
Russell did not cite any cases, but seems to limit the doctrine
when he states: "This Court will not inquire into the legality of
acts done by a foreign Government against its own subjects in
respect of property situate in its own territory." 67
The next major British decision in the "act of state" area arose
out of the nationalization of the oil industry by Iran. In Anglol ranian Oil Go. v. Jaffrate (The Rose Mary), 68 the oil company, a
British corporation, contended that the Iranian nationalization law
was invalid to pass title to oil to Iran on the grounds that the
nationalization was confiscatory and thus a violation of international law. The company sued in a court in Aden to gain possession of oil sold by Iran to a third party, and subsequently bought
to Aden. The Supreme Court of Aden held that the Iranian
nationalization was confiscatory, that such a confiscation was a
violation of international law, and that it was invalid to pass. title
to third parties because the international law was incorporated
into the domestic law of Aden. Luther v. Sagor and Princess Paley
0 lga v. Weisz were distinguished on the ground that they involved
nationals of the confiscating state. This decision has been criticized
on the ground that while international law can make the confiscating state liable to pay damages for its illegal action, it cannot invalidate the confiscation; it is said that while international law
gives a right in personam it gives none in rem. 69 Whether this is
a valid statement of the international law on the point may be
questioned.70 However, even if this view of international law is
66 Id. at 724-725.
67 Id. at 736. Emphasis
68 [1953] l W.L.R. 246.

supplied.

69 O'Connell, "A Critique of the Iranian Oil Litigation," 4 INT. AND COMP. L. Q. 267
at 277 (1955).
70 Commenting on Secretary of State Hull's statement that compensation must be
"adequate and effective" in his note to the Ambassador of Mexico of Nov. 9, 1938, Dept.
of State Press Release, Nov. 12, 1938, No. 541, Hyde states: "It suffices to note •.. that
if Secretary Hull's theory be duly respected, a territorial sovereign may find its very

1959]

COMMENTS

113

accepted, the decision may still be defended. The only controversy
is over the remedy; the right is admitted. Since municipal courts
cannot give an in personam remedy, 71 they should be allowed to
give the best remedy of which they are capable. The only one
available is restitution of the confiscated property. Moreover, even
if the decision cannot be considered purely the result of a direct
application of international law, it could be upheld as an application of public policy.72 Although the public policy doctrine has
been criticized in recent years, 73 this use of the doctrine should be
acceptable, for the court is not relying on its own vague notions of
justice, but on a rule of international law. Since the act of the
confiscating state violated international law, it violates the public
policy of the forum, and will not be given effect.74
The reasoning of the Rose Mary case75 was criticized in the
Chancery case of In re Claim by Helbert Wagg & Co.76 involving
a liquidated contract debt owed by a German company to a British
company. The law governing the contract was German, and the
place specified for payment was London. A German law passed in
1933 altered the place of payment of the debt to Berlin, ~lowed the
payment to be made in marks instead of sterling, and forced the
German debtor to pay the debt into a German Konversionkasse.
The amounts paid into the Konversionkasse were credited to the
accounts of the foreign creditors, but no amounts were shown to
have been paid from the Konversionkasse. The Court assumed
that the law was confiscatory. Nevertheless, the defense of payment into the Konversionkasse was upheld on the ground that
right to expropriate conditioned upon its power to pay, and if it be sought to exercise
that right when evidence of the possession of such power and the disposition to use it
are not evident, there is reason to demand that there be restored to the owners what
may have been taken from them." Hyde, "Compensation for Expropriations," 33 AM. J.
INT. L. 108 at 112 (1939).
71 This would be a judgment against a foreign sovereign, and a foreign sovereign
cannot be sued without his consent. See note 12 supra.
72 See note 2 supra.
73 "[W] e do know enough to say with considerable confidence that an investigation
co determine when the courts will apply the doctrine of public policy to deny the recognition of a foreign right would result in the conclusion, 'you never can tell.' " Nutting,
"Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine," 19 MINN. L. REv. 196 at 200 (1935).
Most of the critics of the public policy doctrine would probably accept its use in this
manner.
74 The results would be predictable and similar to the application of a statute, Nutting,
"Suggested Limitations of the Public Policy Doctrine," 19 MINN. L. REv. 196 (1935); and
would involve the adjudication of a question of public importance, Paulsen and Sovern,
"'Public Policy' in the Conflict of Laws," 56 CoL. L. REv. 969 (1956).
75 [1953] 1 W.L.R. 246.
76 [1956] Ch. 323.

114

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

"these courts must recognize the right of every foreign State to
protect its economy by measures of foreign exchange control and by
altering the value of its currency." 77 This holding is in accord with
the international law on the subject, for such measures are not
recognized as giving a right of compensation.78 Nevertheless,
Justice Upjohn evidently felt that it was a violation of international
law. Therefore, he considered the Rose Mary case at length in the
course of his opinion. He agreed with the holding on its facts,
because he felt that the law was passed "to nationalize the plaintiff
company only" 79 and was thus invalid because it was discriminatory. But he disagreed with the principle that confiscations of
the property of a non-national would not be recognized in British
courts. He felt that Luther v. Sagar and Princess Paley Olga v.
Weisz were applicable whether or not the property confiscated was
owned by a national or non-national of the confiscating state.
The result of the Rose Mary and Helbert Wagg cases is to
leave the "act of state" doctrine unsettled in British law. The Rose
Mary is the only British case which involved the "act of state"
doctrine on its facts. The Helbert Wagg case can be distinguished
on the ground that the action in question was not a violation of
international law. Yet the court did not consider the question in
this light, and the dictum in Luther v. Sagar and Princess Paley
Olga v. Weisz is still formidable. None of the cases, of course, is
binding on the House of Lords, and therefore the question remains
open.
Italian80 and Japanese81 courts were called upon to adjudicate
the title to oil after the Iranian nationalization on facts similar to
those in the Rose Mary case, and both held that the Iranian law
must be recognized as passing title. It is interesting to note, however, that both courts after invoking the "act of state" principle
did consider the question of whether or not the decrees were confiscatory and decided that they were not. If the decrees were not
confiscatory there would, of course, be no violation of international
law. The Japanese court also rejected the contention that the oil
at 351.
note 23 supra.
79 In re Claim by Helbert Wagg&: Co., [1956] Ch. 323 at 346.
SOThe Miriella: Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S. U. P. 0. R., (Venice Law Court, 1953),
2 INT. AND CoMP. L. Q. 628 (1953), as digested and translated by Bresch. Also reported
in 1955 I.L.R. 19.
81 The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. The Idemitsu Kosan Co., (Dist. Court of Tokyo,
1953), 1 JAPANESE ANN. INT. L. 55 (1957), also reported in 1953 I.L.R. 305.
77 Id.

78 See
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had been refined prior to the nationalization, and hence held that
"the applicant . . . had never gained title to the oil in question."82 They then held that the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. had only a
private contract right, and that this could be "subjected to control"83 by the domestic law of Iran. Therefore, this part of the
Japanese court's decision may be rested on the familiar conflict of
laws doctrine that a contract is to be governed by the laws of the
state where it is made,84 or is to be performed,85 which in this instance was Iran. The decision was affirmed on appeal to the
Higher Court of Tokyo.86 The court stated that the nationalization law "is not a completely confiscatory law" but was "subject to
payment of compensation." While recognizing the rule of international law against confiscation, the court held that it could not
examine the adequacy of the compensation if some compensation
were given. The concession agreement was held to be a mere
contract subject to the municipal law of Iran.87
In a later decision involving the Iranian nationalization, a
three-judge Italian court held that Iran gave a right to compensation, and thus that the nationalization was not contrary to international law.88 They held further that the Anglo-Iranian company
did not allege or prove that they had extracted the oil, and that this
was necessary to acquire title under Iranian law.89 It is interesting
to note, however, that they did examine the legality of the Iranian
acts according to Iranian law.9° Further, they stated that "Italian
courts must refuse to apply in Italy such foreign Laws as may, even
for non-political and non-persecutory motives, decree expropriation of the property of any foreign national without compensation."91
In France, the confiscation of a potash company by Catalonia
was held to be "contrary to French public order" and thus invalid
to pass title to potash subsequently sold to a third party and sent
82Id. at 65.
83Id. at 62
84 2 BEALE, CoNFLicr OF LAws §§332.I, 332.4 (1935).
85 Ibid.
86 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabuski Kaisha, (High Court of Tokyo)
1953 I.L.R. 305 at 312.
87 Id at 313-314.
88 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S. U. P. 0. R., (Italy, Civil Court of Rome, 1954), 1955
IL.R. 23.
89 Id. at 42, 43, 45.
90 Id. at 33, 42.
91Id. at 42.
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to France.92 This result was reached even though the company was
registered in Spain. The majority of its stockholders, however,
were Swiss or French. A similar result was reached on substantially
the same facts in Societe Potasas lbericas v. Nathan Bloch,93 the
court stating that "French courts may not recognize any divestment
of a right of ownership, except with the consent of the owner, without just and previous indemnity." 94 Whether these cases now
represent French law on the subject is open to doubt. In the
Hardmuth case95 a French court held that industrial property
rights owned by a Czechoslovakian firm were situated in Czechoslovakia at the time of the nationalization and thus were later
entitled to protection in France. Some commentators, while recognizing that this case had "not been finally decided, for the matter
came only before a judge of the Referes," feel that the case is evidence of a shift in the French attitude toward confiscations.96
It is interesting to note, however, that the decision was rested in
part on an international agreement. That the French attitude is
at present uncertain is further shown by De Keller v. Maison de la
Pensee Francaise.91 This was an application for sequestration of
paintings confiscated during the Russian revolution and later
brought to France for an art show. The application, made to a
judge in chambers, was denied. The judge pointed out that the
granting of the sequestration was essentially optional, that the case
involved third parties not before the court, and that one party
might be the Russian Government which could plead sovereign
immunity. It' is apparent, however, that he considered the question of the validity of the title acquired through the confiscation
an open question.
In the Confiscation of Property of Sudeten Germans Case,98 a
German court held a Czech confiscation of "enemy" property invalid to pass title to a third party. Both plaintiff and defendant
92 Moulin v. Volatron, (France, Comm. Trib. Marseilles, 1937), 1935-1937 ANN. DIG.
191 (No. 68), affd. on appeal (France, Court of Appeal of Aix, 1939), 1938-1940 ANN. DIG.
24 (No. IO).
93 France, Court of Cassation (Chambre Civile, 1939), 1938-1940 ANN. DIG. 150 (No.
54).
94 Id. at 151.
95 France, Cour de Appel de Paris, (14e Chambre, 1950), 79 JOURNAL Du DRorr IN·
TERNATIONAL 1201 (1952).
96 Sarraute and Tager, "Yesterday and Today. The Effects Produced in France by
Foreign Nationalisations," 79 JOURNAL Du DRorr INTERNATIONAL 497, 1139 (1952).
97 France, Tribunal Civil de la Seine (Referes, 1954) 82 JOURNAL Du DRorr INTER·
NATIONAL 119 (1955).
98 Germany, Amtsgericht of Dingolfing (1948), 1948 ANN. DIG. 24 (No. 12).
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were interned in Czechoslovakia. Both owned sewing machines,
and both machines were confiscated. When they were released,
the defendant was given the plaintiff's machine. The plaintiff
sued to recover her machine, and the relief requested was granted,
on the ground that the confiscatory decree was contrary to international law. In a later case involving a confiscation taking place
in the Soviet Zone of Germany a similar result was reached. 99 A
German court has even upheld a criminal charge of conversion
against the defendant's assertion that title to the goods was not in
the former owner, but in the confiscating government.100
From the foregoing review of the practices of other countries,
it is obvious that there is no unanimity in treatment of the problem.
However, the modern decisions examine the question of compensation, and some will not uphold an expropriation unless some
compensation is given.

III.

Policy Considerations

The essential issue involved in the "act of state" doctrine is
whether or not municipal courts of one country will pass judgment
on the legality of the confiscatory actions of another country, when
the title to property is in question before such municipal court. In
passing on the legality of the confiscation the municipal court
could have reference to one or more of three standards: (1) the
public policy of its own country (the forum state), (2) the law
of the confiscating state, and (3) principles of international law.
The "act of state" doctrine prevents the municipal court from in
any way questioning the confiscatory actions of another state.
Should the municipal court so restrain itself?
Many reasons in addition to those discussed above have been
given by the courts and by writers for upholding the "act of state"
doctrine. For instance it may be argued that the doctrine is based
on comity. But it is stronger than this, for it is applied to unrecognized governments,101 and there is no indication that it would
not be applied in favor of the acts of countries which would not
apply the doctrine in their courts.
The doctrine is sometimes said to be merely an application of
09 Expropriation (Soviet Zone of Germany) case, Germany (American Zone), (Court
of Appeal of Nuremberg, 1949), 1949 ANN. DIG. 19 (No. 10).
100 Czechoslovakia Confiscatory Decree case, (American Zone Court of Appeal of
Nuremberg, 1949) 1949 .ANN. Die. 19 (No. 14).
101 Salimoff &: Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N .Y. 220, 186 N .E. 679 (1933).
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the conflict of laws rule that passage of title will be determined by
the law of the situs of the property at the time. This is not the
case, however, for the doctrine is applied by American courts even
when the acts are illegal by the law of the confiscating state.102
Further, an application of a conflict of laws doctrine would normally be tempered by grounds of public policy.103 This doctrine is
not.104
One writer has suggested that a rejection of the rule would
make questions of title to confiscated goods doubtful, and dependent upon the law of the country to which they were ultimately
brought.105 That situation now exists, however, as not all countries follow the rule, and the countries which do follow it may
deny its application on political grounds.106
Lipstein suggests that restricting the rule to confiscations of the
property of nationals of the foreign state would result in discrimination against aliens in the courts of the forum.107 This is not true.
All aliens would be treated in accord with the rules of international
law. Nationals of all states other than the confiscating state would
receive the same treatment. Nationals of the confiscating state
would be denied protection only because international law cannot
protect them.108
Seidl-Hohenveldern states that restoring the confiscated goods
to their former owners "would soon bring trade with some con•
fiscating countries to a virtual standstill."109 But similarly it can
be argued that such a policy would bring confiscations "to a
virtual standstill," since a country would normally not derive any
benefit from confiscation if it could not market the fruits of its
confiscation. Also, the effects of a court's action on world trade
should not lead it to a denial of justice. If those effects are felt
detrimental by the forum state's executive, the executive can take
action to mitigate or abolish those effects within his recognized
sphere of authority. This also resolves the objection raised by
some authorities that the question is a political one, and so should
be left to the executive. The executive has ample means to fore102Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, (2d Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 438.
103 See note 2 supra.
104 Cf. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, (2d Cir. 1949) 173 F. (2d) 71.
105 Comment 57 YALE L. J. 108 (1947).
106 Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche Amerikaansche, (2d Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 375.
101 Lipstein, note, 1956 CAMB. L. J. 138.
10s See note 9 supra.
109 Seidl-Hohenveldern, "Extraterritorial Effects of Confiscations and Expropriations,"
49 MICH. L. REv. 851 at 860 (1951).
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stall any court action which it might consider harmful, and thus
can resolve political questions through political channels, instead
of allowing them to be resolved by default, often in an unsatisfactory manner, by the courts. Although it might be contended
that this would force the executive to a positive declaration of
policy, and thus embarrass the executive, that is also the result
of the present policy, as an aftermath of the Bernstein litigation.
Perhaps the most important arguments for the doctrine, however, are those which say that for one state to examine the validity
of another state's acts in accordance with the standards of international law would "vex the peace of nations," and would be an
interference with the sovereignty of the state whose acts are examined. Sometimes the question raised is whether such an examination of itself would be a violation of international law.110
In support of the "act of state" doctrine, it is thought that it
would be an insult to a state for a second state to declare its acts a
violation of international law. This insult would create tension
between the two states.111 This argument seems weak on two
grounds. First, it should not be an insult to a state for a second
state to enforce a rule of international law, since the first state
should expect its actions to be upheld internationally only when
those actions do not exceed its rights under international law.
Second, the initial act of confiscation, and not the attempt by a
national court to apply international law to mitigate the effects
of the illegal act, is the act which "vexes the peace of nations." It
would also seem to strain international relations for state A to
deny the rights of nationals of state B because of state A's refusal
to review the illegal acts of state C.112 It has been suggested that
such a refusal would make the forum state "a party to the delinquency."113
110 This question is raised by Lauterpacht, "Public International Law-Foreign Legis•
Iation Enacted in Violation of International Law-Effect in England," 1954 CAMB. L. J. 20
at 21, who holds that it would not be a violation of international law. Wortley, "Observations on the Public and Private International Law Relating to Expropriation," 5 AM. J.
COMP. L. 577 at 592 (1956); Mann, "International Delinquencies Before Municipal
Courts," 70 L.Q. R.Ev. 181 at 198 (1954); and Rheinstein, "Correspondence: Observations
on Expropriation," 7 AM. J. CoMP. L. 86 at 88 (1958), concur in this view.
111 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 at 304 (1918).
112 "[I]t may be said that friendly relations are likely to suffer if the courts of a
country are constrained to lend their assistance to perpetrating a legal wrong committed
either against its nationals or the nationals of another state (other than the confiscating
State itself)." Lauterpacht, "Public International Law-Foreign Legislation Enacted in
Violation of International Law-Effect in England," 1954 CAMB. L. J. 20 at 21.
113 Mann, "International Delinquencies Before Municipal Courts," 70 L. Q. R.Ev.
181 at 198 (1954).
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Similarly, it has been said that for one state to review the acts
of another state committed within its own territory is an interference with the sovereignty of the second state.114 This argument
undoubtedly arises from the concept of absolute or territorial
sovereignty in vogue in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,115
which has been progressively limited in the modem era.116 It
would seem to be as great a denial of the sovereignty of the forum
state to hold that they could not again affect the title to the property through an application of their own law. When it is realized
that there is no attempt to declare the law of the foreign state invalid within its own territory,11 7 but only to deny extraterritorial
effects to that act,11 8 it will be recognized that there is no denial
of sovereignty.
Kelsen says that the "act of state" doctrine is itself a rule of
international law. He cites only British and American precedents,
however.11 9 If confiscations of the type under discussion are themselves violations of a rule of international law, it is strange that the
enforcement of that rule should be similarly held a violation. In
the case of nationality laws, the Hague Convention on the Conflict
of Nationality Laws of 1930 imposes a duty of recognition only to
the extent that the law of the first· state is in conformance with
international law,120 and both municipal121 and international
114 The Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. The Idemitsu Kosan Co., (Dist. Court of Tokyo,
1953), I JAPANESE ANN. INT. L. 55 at 62 (1957), also reported in 1953 I.L.R. 305.
, 115 Dunn, "International Law and Private Property Rights," 28 CoL. L. REv. 166
(1928).
116 E.g., the international law rule against confiscations; the Nuremberg war-crimes
trials; the restriction of sovereign immunity when the state engages in trading ventures.
See also JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS I (1948): "Unlimited sovereignty is no longer
automatically accepted as the most prized possession or even as a desirable attribute of
states."
117 Denial of effect to the Iranian nationalization law "may prevent the application,
but can never annul, set aside or destroy the Persian law, which will always remain fully
effective within the Persian State." The Miriella: Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. S.U.P.O.R.,
(Venice Law Court, 1953), 2 INT. AND COMP. L. Q. 628 (1953); also in 1955 I. L. R. 19.
118 "It is thus important to distinguish between titles acquired solely by some local
law, by an act of sovereignty, and those acquired by an act of sovereignty in conformity
with public international law, since only such internationally lawful acquisitions have a
claim to international validity. • . • A confiscating sovereign cannot expect his title,
acquired solely by his own law and in contradiction to international law, to be universally
guaranteed, and indeed it is not. Once the question of sovereign immunity goes, then a
mere declaration by a sovereign will not confer a title. Wortley, "Expropriation in International Law," 33 TRANs. GRoT. Soc. 25 at 31, 33 (1947).
119 KEl.sEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 256 (1952).
120 5 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 359 (1936).
121 Mathieu Ulmann et Nathan Ulmann c. Min. pub., (France, Trib. Civ. de la Seine,
1915), 1915-1916 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 67.
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tribunals122 have refused to recognize a state's "naturalization" of
an alien when it was contrary to international law, even though
the alien was resident in the naturalizing country at the time of the
alleged naturalization. The confiscation of private property by a
belligerent has been repeatedly denied effect by other municipal
courts,123 including our own,12 4 when it is found to be a violation
of international law. On the other hand, no international tribunal
has ever held a refusal to apply the "act of state" doctrine to be a
violation of international law, and there has been no diplomatic
protest against a judicial decision which has failed to apply it.125
While perhaps the doctrine was at one time properly regarded as a
rule of international law, the emergence of the rule of international
law against the confiscation of the property of aliens may alter.
this fact. 126 Moreover, even as a rule of international law, if it was
ever so regarded, the doctrine rested on the practices of but a few
states.
In light of the increasing authority holding that acts of confiscation are violations of international law,127 the "act of state"
doctrine no longer seems advisable. By abandoning that doctrine
in favor of the emerging international law rule American courts
could avoid weakening that rule by in effect indirectly sanctioning
its violation. The rights of persons who had been affected by the
122 FELLER, MEXICAN CLAIMS COMMISSIONS 98, 100 (1935); 3 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATIONS 2468-2483 (1898).
123 Suita v. Guzkowski, (Poland, S. Ct., 3d Div., 1921) 1919-1922 ANN. DIG. 480 (No.
342); Hungarian S. Ct. resolution 1922, 1919-1922 ANN. DIG. 482; M. v. Aktieselskabet K. H.
[German, Reichsgericht (in Civil Matters) 1934], 1933-1934 ANN. DIG. 501 (No. 217).
In Rosenberg v. Fischer, [Switzerland, Fed. Trib. (Chamber for the Restitution of Assets
Seized in Occupied Territory) 1948], the court said, "In fact, an object seized from its
owner in a manner contrary to international law has, without doubt, the character of
stolen or lost property in the meaning of Article 934, par. I, of the Civil Code. • • ."
1948 ANN. DIG. 467 at 468 (No. 150).
124 State of the Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank, (S.D. N.Y. 1951) 99 F. Supp.
655. The court stated, however, that the "act of state" doctrine was not involved. On
appeal, the question was left open, (2d Cir. 1953) 201 F. (2d) 455.
125 Mann, "International Delinquencies before Municipal Courts," 70 L. Q. REv. 181 at
198 (1954).
126 "A conflict of two rules of international law then arises. The rule according to
which the courts of one State do not sit in judgment on acts of another state may conflict
with the rule that aliens shall not be deprived of their property without compensation.
It is submitted that settlement of such a conflict might be found by applying the generally
accepted principle of lex posterior derogat legi priori." "The Legal Effects of Nationalizations Enacted by Foreign States," Report of the Netherlands Branch of the International
Law Association, New York University Conference, p. 9 (1958).
127 It can also be said that the confiscating state acted without jurisdiction in inter•
national law. See O'Connell, "A Critique of the Iranian Oil Litigation," 4 INT. &: COMP.
L.Q. 267 at 291 (1955); Mann, "International Delinquencies before Municipal Courts,"
70 L. Q. REv. 181 at 194 (1954).

122

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 58

confiscation would be upheld.128 Perhaps most important, there
would be much less incentive for foreign states to expropriate
without compensation. Since most expropriating countries are
generally underdeveloped, they are in need of capital goods from
other countries. The major suppliers of such goods are often the
United States, Britain, France and Germany. If the United States
and Britain were to follow the example of France and Germany
and not recognize title to confiscated goods, the confiscating
country would have difficulty using the goods so obtained to
acquire needed capital goods and the benefits derived from the
confiscation would be drastically circumscribed.

John C. Peters, S.Ed.
128 The rights of innocent third parties who purchased goods without knowledge of
the confiscatory character of their title could perhaps be protected by an adaptation of the
theory that title so acquired is not void but voidable, and not voidable against third party
bona fide purchasers.

